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4
Introduction

The Individuals

Andy Meeks was a white 8th grade student who suffered Attention Hyperactivity
Disorder and Dyslexia and lived in Seattle, Washington in 2001. Although middle school was
difficult for him, he showed great improvement when working hands on in small groups. For this
reason when it came time to choose a high school, Andy and his mother Jill Kurfust decided to
apply to a small Biotechnology program run through the large Ballard public high school. Andy
was accepted into the small program, but was told that he would be unable to attend Ballard
because of his race. If Andy had attended Ballard, it would have become “racially imbalanced”
meaning that its racial makeup would not closely reflect the racial demographics of the overall
district.1 In response his mother, Jill Kurfurst joined the nonprofit organization Parents Involved
in Community Schools, which filed suit against the Seattle School district for using race as a
decisive factor in school assignments, arguing that this violated the Equal Protection Clause of
14th Amendment.
In August 2002 Crystal Meredith moved into the Jefferson County School District,
located in Louisville Kentucky and attempted to enroll her son Joshua in kindergarten at their
neighborhood school located a mile away. However there was no space at this school so Joshua
was assigned to Young elementary located 10 miles away. Meredith attempted to transfer Joshua
to another school, Bloom Elementary, which was also only a mile away from their home.
However Joshua’s transfer was denied because “it would have an adverse affect on the
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desegregation compliance.”2 This led Meredith like Kurfurst to file suit against the Jefferson
County School District for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Eventually Meredith’s case (Meredith v. Jefferson County) was merged with Kurfurst
into one large Supreme Court case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No .1. The result of this 2007 case was a controversial Supreme Court decision in which
both Seattle and Louisville’s race conscious plans were declared unconstitutional because the
way each considered race in public school assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment.
In my opinion the decision in Parents Involved has the potential to change the way race is
factored into public education. It could have very important consequences for our nation’s
schools because it could possibly prevent school districts from adjusting to inequalities that
occur from the currents of society that disadvantage many minorities, which are known as de
facto. This case dealt specifically with racially isolated schools and whether a state has the same
power to combat schools which are products of de facto segregation as it does schools which are
the result of government enforced segregation, which is known as de jure.
I will argue that the reasoning used to determine the verdict in the decision adopts a
controversial reading of the 14th Amendment. This reading has arisen out of a lack of clarity in a
number of Supreme Court decisions concerning race and public education, especially in the
landmark case University Regents v. Bakke decided in 1979. In my opinion this reading is
inimical to the original purpose of the 14th Amendment and the Supreme Court that decided
Brown v. Board of Education, along with its subsequent decisions concerning school
desegregation.
2
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This reasoning has steadily gained speed to the point that it was almost endorsed by a
majority of the Supreme Court in Parents involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No.1. Some theorists such as Michael J. Gerhart have commended this decision as a
prime example of the judicial prudence because they believe that it followed the correct
precedent.3 I do not agree with this claim and throughout the rest of this text I will prove why
this reading of the 14th Amendment is not applicable to public education and also show how this
reading has gained so much prominence. However before delving into this argument it is
important to further understand the case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District NO. 1 and the history of the two school districts associated with it.

3
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Chapter 1
The Districts

In 1963 the city of Seattle operated a highly segregated school system. This segregation
was never enforced by law, but was due to residential de facto desegregation. The NAACP along
with other local groups convinced the School Board of Seattle to adopt a race-transfer policy,
which explicitly stated that a black student could transfer to a predominately white school and a
white student could transfer to a predominately black school. At that time Garfield, the central
district high school was 2/3 minorities, while the majority of the other public high schools were
all white.4 The plan employed by the district did not satisfy the NAACP. In 1969 it filed a
federal lawsuit against the school board claiming that the board had “established and
maintained” a system of racially segregated public schools using techniques such as
“drawing…boundary lines” and “executing school attendance policies.” 5 In response to this suit
the school board introduced a mandatory busing plan that utilized race based transfers between
the districts “white” and “minority” public schools. This plan was instituted from 1976-1977 and
involved roughly 2000 students out of the districts total population of 60,000.
“Busing” by its general definition is the mandatory transfer of students to public schools
other than those closest to their homes for a specific purpose. Most busing plans are invoked so
that each of districts schools will contain a racial demographic that relatively reflects that of the
district as a whole. During the time that Seattle adopted its plan busing was not new or unique,
but rather common in many school districts. During the early 1970’s the NAACP filed numerous

4
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suits against many school districts throughout the country. Those unlike Seattle that did not
comply often were taken to court where they usually lost and were forced to adopt busing plans.
Although the Seattle school board had instituted a large plan, by 1977 the board
continued to describe 26 of its 112 schools as segregated or “racially identifiable.” Racially
identifiable means that one race is much more heavily represented in a school compared to others
and consequently characterizes the school.6 The NAACP brought another suit claiming that the
school board had not complied with the previous suit and exhibited a pattern of “delay in respect
to the implementation of promised desegregation efforts”7 and had continued to perpetuate
unlawful segregation. Instead of going to court the two sides entered into a settlement known as
“the Seattle Plan” which was implemented in 1978. This unlike the first plan, which was half
hearted at best, resembled the extensive busing plans that were instituted after 1973. This plan
considered any school that had a race that was not within 20% of district’s total demographics as
imbalanced. To achieve the goal of racially integrated schools the district employed extensive
busing services; about half of all the districts students attended a school other than the one
closest to their home.
The School District achieved its goal of racial diversity but at a high cost. Many White
families objected to busing plans of 1970s and either moved to the suburbs or enrolled their
children in private schools. This symptom was known as “White Flight.” By 1988 Seattle had
fallen victim to white flight and the school district’s total population had dropped from 100,000
to 50,000 with a makeup of 43% percent white, 24% black and 23% Asian or Pacific Islander
with Native American and Hispanics making up the other 10%. This shift in demographics
greatly reduced the Seattle Plan’s effectiveness. This combined with the public’s growing
6
7
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opposition to the plan and the costs of the extensive busing associated with it led the school
board to abandon it for a more lenient student assignment plan.8 The new plan, which was
instituted in 1999, was what is known as a “choice plan.” It sought to relax racial constraints,
which in the previous busing plan were extremely rigid and increase a student’s choice in
schools.
Choice plans are combinations of neighborhood schools assignments, which simply
assign students to schools closest to their homes and busing plans.9 Choice plans allow students
and their parents to list the schools available in their district according to their preference.
Students are then assigned to one of their chosen schools based on a set of criteria chosen by the
school board. A student’s choice is the primary tenet for assigning schools, but should a school
become oversubscribed the district will employ a tiebreaker based on its chosen criteria to
determine student’s placement.
Many school districts such as Seattle stopped busing and began using what are known as
“controlled choice plans” to increase student choice and still maintain racially balanced schools.
This simply means that districts incorporate certain criteria into their tiebreaker process to create
schools that are not racially identifiable. Some districts, such as Wausau Wisconsin are able to
use other factors such as geographic and socioeconomic facts as criteria to achieve desired racial
proportions.10 However others districts such as Louisville, Kentucky, Seattle, Washington,
Knoxville, Tennessee, La Crosse, Wisconsin and Boston, Massachusetts have had to use more
overt racial criteria in their tiebreakers.11 Using such criteria means that some students depending

8
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on their race may not get into their first choice if their acceptance would cause a racial imbalance
in the school.
The choice plan adopted by Seattle was not a normal choice plan, but a “controlled” one
that used race based constraints. For example in high school assignments, a student was able to
list his or her top three choices.12 In assigning pupils to schools the district would first take into
account whether or not that student had a sibling already at their desired school. Second the
tiebreaker considered that student’s race in relation to the racial makeup of that school. If the
student attending a school would cause one race to become “over represented” in relation to the
demographics of the district the spot would go to another individual of a different race. In
Seattle’s plan schools had to have racial percentages that fell within 10% of the district. The third
aspect used in the criteria was how close that student lived to the school, and the fourth was if the
student received childcare in the neighborhood. After attending a previously assigned school for
a year individuals could transfer to any school of their choice and not have their race taken into
account. During the period that the tiebreaker was used (1999-2001) between 89% and 97%
percent of students received their first or second choice assignments and those that did not were
able to transfer the following year. It is important to note that the few students denied their first
choice were not only white students, but any student whose race would throw the school outside
10% of the district.
Unlike Seattle, Louisville and the entire state of Kentucky did operate legally sanctioned
segregated schools and the district was therefore subject to a court order to desegregate after the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. After the Brown II hearing in 1955 the Louisville
Board of Education adopted an open transfer policy to facilitate desegregation. About 3,000 of
12

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)

11
district’s 46,000 students applied for transfer. The plan overall had little effect on the district’s
dual school system because the district was also racially polarized residentially. In 1972
“Fourteen out of the district’s nineteen non-vocational middle and high schools were close to
totally black or totally white. Nineteen of the district’s forty-six elementary schools were
between 80% and 100% black and twenty-one elementary schools were between roughly 90%
and 100% white.”13 Because the school district’s plan had such a minimal effect it should come
as no surprise that in 1975 a conglomerate of parents and civil rights groups brought suit against
the school board in federal court and were victorious.
The new plan adopted was expansive and diverse in the methods that it employed to
achieve its goal. It first amalgamated several school districts into one, now known as the
Jefferson County School System, which had a total of 134,000 students, 20% of whom were
black. Under this plan, for an elementary school to be considered desegregated it would have to
have at least 12% to 40% of it pupils black, and for secondary education a school would have to
be 12.5% to 35% black. To achieve this result the school board closed 12 schools, redrew its
attendance zones and then implemented an extensive busing system, which transported some
23,000 students daily. This plan was effective in achieving its desired goal of eliminating the
districts racially identifiable schools. Even though the case was removed from the courts docket
the district was still expected “to continue to implement those portions of the desegregation order
which are by their nature of a continuing effect.”14
In 1991 the school board decided that change in the district’s demographic make up had
rendered the plan ineffective. The board worked hard with community groups and parents in the
district to devise a plan that would fit the needs of the community. The result was a new plan
13
14
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labeled “Project Renaissance.” Project Renaissance modified the percents of student populations
to 15% to 50% black in elementary schools, along with minimum of 15% of the general
percentage for both Blacks and Whites in all middle and high schools. Elementary students
would be assigned to their neighborhood schools with the limitation that only a black student
could transfer from a predominately black school to a predominately white school and vice
versa. Middle school students were assigned to neighborhood schools and high school students
were subject to open enrollment in a similar manner to the choice plan adopted by the Seattle
School District.
In 1996, to adjust to changing demographics, the Louisville School board modified
Project Renaissance, resulting in its final desegregation plan, which was in effect during Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 decision. The plan removed
“racial guidelines”, set the racial limits in terms of percentages at 15% to 50% black for all
schools, withdrew assignment boundaries and expanded the transfer system accorded to high
school students to both the elementary and middle school systems. The one new precept of this
transfer system was that a student could not transfer to school if that transfer would result in that
school falling out of its racial boundaries. This plan proved very effective and consequently the
court order was dissolved in 2000. The federal court acknowledged that the districts compliance
and methodology stating that, “overwhelming evidence of the Board’s good faith compliance
with the desegregation decree and its underlying purposes.”15
The court order was eventually dissolved because district had eliminated all vestiges of
its previously state imposed segregated system. After this the district was no longer obliged to
continue maintaining racially balanced public schools, however it continued to do so. As the
court noted when dissolving the order the school district had, “treated the ideal of an integrated
15
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system as much more than a legal obligation--they consider[ed] it a positive, desirable policy and
an essential element of any well-rounded public school education.”16 It was for this reason that
the board continued to implement the policy. Not because it had to, but because it felt that
racially balanced school were desirable end.

The Decision

Seattle and Louisville lost Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District NO. 1. As a result both are now practically barred from using any racial considerations
in their school assignments. The court was essentially split right down the middle in its verdict.
The majority featured more conservative judges Chief Justice Robert and Justices Alito, Scalia,
Thomas and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy concurred only partially with the majority opinion, but
still gave it the necessary vote to decide the case. The majority decided that Seattle and
Louisville did not have the compelling interest required to consider race in the manner they did
in public school assignments.
The Supreme Court has three levels of review, which it uses to determine whether a
state’s action is a constitutional violation.17 The first and lightest form of review is “rational
basis” in which the court determines whether a government action is rationally related to a
legitimate interest. The next level is “intermediate scrutiny” in which the government must first
establish that it has an important interest and that the policies or laws it uses contribute
substantially to that important interest. The last level of review is “strict scrutiny”, which is
invoked if a government action possibly violates a constitutional right or uses suspect
16
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classifications such as race or religion. When strict scrutiny is invoked the government must
prove that it has a compelling interest for employing it policy or statute. Once this is established
the state must prove that its action is “narrowly tailored” enough to achieve it desired interest.
The majority of cases where the Supreme Court invokes strict scrutiny the government statute or
policy under review is deemed unconstitutional. Strict scrutiny is always applied to any racial
classifications.18
The majority stated that for a state to use racial classifications in educational assignments
it must have a compelling state interest. In other words a state can only use racial considerations
if it is for a necessary purpose in which race is a last resort:
Because racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification…governmental
distributions of burdens or benefits based on individual classifications…Thus, the
school districts must demonstrate that their use of such classifications is
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” government interest.19
Justice Roberts in the plurality’s opinion asserted that in terms of education there are only two
state interests that the court has recognized as compelling enough to legitimize a state’s to use of
racial considerations in public schooling. These are “remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination” (i.e. legally enforce segregation) and “in broadening student body diversity...”20
In this second interest race must be one of many factors, such as having a second language or
overcoming personal adversity, which are all valued equally.21 The Robert’s plurality did not
find that either state had a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past intentional

18
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discrimination. This is because as stated before, Seattle was never under a court order for de jure
segregation, and Louisville had already had its court order dissolved.
The only interest that either district could use as compelling was diversity in student
body.22 It was therefore not surprising that the court found that neither district was able to prove
that it was “narrowly tailored” enough to legitimize it use of race in broadening the diversity in
either student bodies. The plurality insisted that “race was not considered as part of a broader
effort to achieve exposure to a widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints… race, for
some students, is determinative standing alone”23 and amounted to nothing more than racial
balancing in other words racial integration. The plurality claimed that racial balancing was and
still is “an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate”24, illustrating its
position that absent any constitutional violation the use of race even used to prevent racial
identifiable schools is unconstitutional.
The main thrust of Justice Robert’s opinion is the rejection of the idea that school
integration is a constitutionally acceptable interest. This rejection is based on what I will call the
“anti-classificationist” reasoning. This reasoning is the belief that according to the 14th
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause the government should not use racially classifications,
and any which it does are automatically suspect. Whether the classification used is for inclusive
or exclusive purposes is of no consequence. This reading of the 14th Amendment professes a
belief that the amendment was created to assure neutrality in government action. The
government should not have any biases in terms of race even if it is for the purpose of creating

22
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equal opportunity. In closing Justice Robert’s elucidates this belief in his interpretation of
Brown:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to
school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not
carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again—
even for very different reasons… The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.25
Robert’s makes it clear that even racial considerations used for integration goals such as creating
a pluralistic society is constitutionally wrong.
The other side consisting of Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer and Souter dissented,
asserting that both districts did have compelling interest in maintaining a racially balanced
school system. In the case of Seattle, Breyer claimed that even though the Seattle district had not
come under a direct court order and was never segregated by law, it had settled two suits with the
NAACP, which essentially amounted to an admission of being guilty of practicing segregation.
Therefore it in a sense did have a legitimate claim that it was “remedying past intentional
discrimination.”26 If districts could only desegregate under a court order what was to be made of
the Southern districts that had practiced segregation by law, but had settled in court and thus had
not come under a court order. Breyer questioned were these districts not obligated to desegregate
their schools to the extent of those that had come under court order? Breyer also stated that some
districts, such as Jefferson County, even though already unitary had seen the educational benefits
of their desegregation plans and for that reason still intended to utilize them even after their court
orders were dissolved:
…Louisville’s history makes clear that a community under a court order to
desegregate might submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court
dissolved the order, but with every intention of following the plan even after
25
26
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dissolution. How could such a plan be lawful the day before dissolution but then
becomes unlawful the very next day? 27
He also went on in his dissent to claim that the histories of both districts suggested that each tried
a number of methods such as busing to desegregate their schools and had steadily worked their
way to the current plans under review.
In his book Forced Justice: School Segregation and the Law David Armor discusses the
difficulty of school boards have in determining what types of desegregation and racial balancing
plans to use. Throughout the book he asserts that are no plans at all that are proven to be
effective in every context, and that many states consequently have had to gradually figure out
what works for their specific district.28 He also notes that many districts have steadily gravitated
toward “controlled choice plans”29 as strategies. Justice Breyer seems to feel the same way
because he thought that both the Jefferson and the Seattle District’s several changes constituted
good faith consideration of the of board’s policies and were thus narrowly tailored enough to use
race in school assignments.
The rest of Breyer’s dissent is based on his rejection of the plurality’s conviction that
there are only two compelling interests that permit the use of race in school assignments. He
asserted that school districts do have a compelling interest in maintaining racially integrated
schools aside from the diversity interest and past discrimination. This interest he labels “racial
integration”:
By this term, I mean the school districts’ interest in eliminating school-by-school
racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes
each of the school districts’ schools and each individual student’s public school
experience.30
27
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Breyer argues this point quite eloquently, relying on numerous court decisions that followed the
influential Brown decision.
Both sides based their judgments in the notorious Brown v. Board of Education decision.
Each side essentially accused the other of misinterpreting the meaning of the decision and
consequently how the 14th Amendment is meant to apply to race in public education. Justice
Robert’s anti-classificationalist opinion completely rejected Justice Breyer’s argument that racial
integration is a legitimate interest absent any previous de jure segregation. Joshua and Meredith
were individuals whose race could not be a decisive factor in school assignments because the
14th Amendment guaranteed them racial neutrality with respect to public education. Breyer’s
opinion sided with Seattle and Louisville because he believed that 14th Amendment was intended
provide security to minority groups who would otherwise fall victim to majoritarian forces of
society which could subjugate them.
I agree with Breyer on this point because I believe that the framers that 14th Amendment
were aware that a complex milieu of state, local and private interferences could prevent minority
groups, particularly African Americans from enjoying equal protection of the law. I feel that
Robert’s position misinterprets the true intentions of Brown and the purpose of Equal Protection
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment which were meant to reject not all racial classifications only
those that oppress racial minorities. The 14th Amendment does allow for a state to take account
of individual’s race in public school assignments so that it can protect minority students from
societies harmful current such as residential segregation, which is a growing problem in this
country.31 To prove this I will first provide what I believe is an accurate reading of the 14th
Amendment in accordance with the intent of its framers. Second I will illustrate how Brown
31
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produced no precedent and was rather ambiguous as to how it should be applied, even though it
simply sought to eliminate segregation in American education. Third I will show how the intent
of Brown became clear in its preceding cases and produced a very clear precedent for preventing
racially identifiable schools. Fourth I will illustrate how there is another precedent for reviewing
racial considerations in government-funded education, which arose from Supreme Court
decisions concerning higher education in which merit was involved. In this work I will attempt
illustrate how Justice Robert’s conflates these two precedents and misapplies the one meant only
for higher education into lower education in Parents Involved.

20
Chapter 2

The New Birth Amendments

In this chapter I will first discuss the creation of “the New Birth Amendments”,
particularly the 14th before discussing Brown v. Board of Education. If one is to understand how
the 14th Amendment should apply to race and public education it is essential to understand it in
the context that it was created because this particular amendment is now the primary source of
disagreement in Parents Involved. The Civil War took place in large part over the issue of
slavery specifically “the Great Compromise of 1850” and the “Fugitive Slave Act” associated
with it.32 This act allowed slaveholders to protect their “property” within many northern states
where slavery was banned. Along with this legislation Congress created a “posse comitatus” of
federal commissioners whose job it was to recapture slaves if they escaped into any of the free
states. If any private citizen was caught interfering with this process the federal commissioners
had the power to arrest and imprison him. The Northern states felt the federal government in
passing the Fugitive Slave Act had violated their sovereignty in order to appease the slave
holding Southern states. After the Dread Scott case allowed the new territories to become slave
holding, the Northern states were convinced that compromise on the subject of slavery was
impossible which largely contributed to the Civil War.33
After the Civil War the 13th Amendment ended slavery forever,34 however the Southern
states disrespected the amendment and simply passed a series of statutes called the Black Codes,

32
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which were designed keep African Americans in servitude, but not under the explicit title of
slavery. In response to these statutes Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to guarantee
Blacks the rights necessary for a free existence:
The Civil Rights Act of 1866… [guaranteed] blacks the same right in every state
and territory of the united states to make and enforce contracts to sue, be parties
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell and convey real and personal
property; and full and equal benefit of the laws and proceedings for the security of
person and security as is enjoyed by white citizens”35
In order to enforce these rights so that they would be respected by all of the states and not be
overturned in the future, Congress passed the 14th Amendment.36 The language of the 14th
Amendment is directed at the states37, which were trying to deprive African Americans of the
vital rights recently granted to them by the Civil Rights Act. The 14th Amendment codified the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 so that it would not be overturned by a future congress and so that the
states couldn’t impede on African American rights.
The 14th Amendment contained Section 5, which stated that, “Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”38 Robert Newman
and J.J. Gass illustrate in their article “ A New Birth” that Section 5 was written not just so
Congress could have the power to secure the new rights against the states but also against private
actors. White society in the Southern states and many states in the North were not ready to accept
African Americans into society as agents in themselves. Section 5 was written with the
understanding that these individuals and society at large might try to prevent the Blacks from
enjoying benefits of the rights they had just received:
35
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Congress could invoke section five authority whenever individuals were
prevented from – enjoying as a practical manner – the rights guaranteed by
section 1. Even if states maintained facially nondiscriminatory laws, their failure
or inability to prevent private actors from interfering with civil rights would give
congress license to remedy the situation… The private terror aimed at blacks and
republicans during Reconstruction of left unchecked, would effectively overturn
the New Birth Amendments.
Section 5 was modeled after the Fugitive Slave Act but for an opposite purpose. It made no
difference whether the agent interfering with the rights of Africans Americans was a state or
whether it was a private one from society. The federal government had the power to keep it in
check.39 Even if it was a matter where the state government failed to protect it citizens, the 14th
Amendment gave the federal government the right to intervene.40 This is a very important point
because the federal government forced legislation on states not only for disobeying, but also for
failure to act.
Although some assert that the purpose of the 14th Amendment was to “establish and
defend” the equality of African Americans this is actually a very controversial claim. Many
historians of the congress that passed the amendment such as Raoul Berger have argued that this
congress viewed African Americans as inferior and for that reason did not intend for African
Americans to be equal. They argue that the 14th Amendment was only meant to protect the
specific enumerated rights contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 everything else should be
left to the states:
No trace of an intention by the Fourteenth Amendment to encroach on State
control—for example, suffrage and segregation—is to be found in the records of
the 39th congress. A mass of evidence is to the contrary, and as will appear the
attachment of the framers to State sovereignty played a major role in restricting
the scope of the amendment.41
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The 14th Amendment’s meaning is now very controversial and there are many theories as to its
intent back then. For the purposes of this paper I will adopt Bickel and Berger’s rigidly
originalist view, which is devoid of any interpretive qualities except historical context.42 If it was
not enumerated right in the Civil Rights Act, the federal government could not enforce it upon
the states in the intense manner that it could one that was enumerated.
If one adopts such a view it is impossible to believe that African Americans were
supposed to be alleviated by the 14th Amendment to the extent that they were equal to whites.
They were only supposed have the rights necessary to be considered free.43 This is why the
Fifteenth Amendment was adopted because the Civil Rights Act did not enumerate the right to
suffrage and thus African Americans could not vote until the amendment was passed. Although
Congress had the intention of protecting African Americans constitutional rights the Supreme
Court during the late 19th century severely limited the scope of its power. Decisions such as The
Slaughter House Cases in 1873, Unites States v. Reese in 1875 and United State v. Cruikshank in
1875 reduced the federal government’s ability to protect African Americans from state and
private action. African Americans after the period of reconstruction were restricted to an inferior
status in terms of political and civil rights because the federal government could only enforce
what was enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. Everything else was left to the recalcitrant state
governments who would never voluntarily lend blacks a helping hand.
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Separate But Equal

Although slaves had been freed, states practiced de jure segregation, especially in the
South under the title of “Jim Crow Laws.” Jim Crow Laws were usually state or local ordinances
that legally separated Whites from Blacks in public facilities such as restaurants, hotels, theaters,
waiting rooms, buses, trains, restrooms and even beaches. For many years after Reconstruction
the South and a large part of America operated dual systems, one for Whites and the other for
Blacks. The backbone of this segregated system was thought to be public education, as starting
in elementary school children practically grew up in a one-race world.44 Southerners felt that
public schooling was the most important place that segregation operated. When Brown ended
school segregation it affected some 11.5 million students, both black and white and affected
nearly 11,173 school districts, which amounted to 39 percent of all of school children in the
United States.45
Although there were a number of decisions, which preceded it such as Roberts v. Boston,
the despised case Plessy v. Ferguson, decided in 1896 by the Fuller Supreme Court, provided the
constitutional legitimacy for legal segregation. The case focused on Homer Plessy an African
American who bought a ticket for a white car on a train in Louisiana and was removed from it as
soon as he was identified as black. Plessy filed suit, asserting that the statute was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment because it denoted inferiority to his race.
The case challenged the constitutionality of segregation on the basis that it denoted inferiority on
the African American race. However the court voted 8 to 1 against him. The court’s opinion as
delivered by Justice Brown held that “…we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even
44
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requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances, is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment. ”46 And that “Laws permitting, and even requiring their
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the
inferiority of the other.”47 The reasoning revolved around the idea that if segregation denoted
racial inferiority to African Americans it was only because they chose to interpret it that way, not
because it was actually true. The decision in Plessy constitutionally legitimized what became
known as “the separate, but equal doctrine” and set the precedent for de jure segregation in later
decisions such as Cumming v. Richmond County School Board 1898 and Gong Lum v. Rice in
1927 that reinforced the platform for segregated schools.
Even though the Plessy decision is remembered as a stain on Supreme Court’s record, it
nevertheless contributed to the dialogue for racial equality in American society. Although
facilities and services could be separate, they needed to be equal to be constitutional. During
most of the time that Jim Crow was implemented most African American facilities including
school systems were inferior to that of whites:
The system...dumped black children, two-thirds of whom still lived in the
southern and border states, into poorly funded, often ramshackle schools. In 1940
public spending per pupil in southern black school was only 45 percent of that in
white schools. In South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama it was only 33 percent; in
Mississippi, it was 15 percent. At that time, white officials in hundreds of heavily
black counties in the South authorized little of no high schooling for blacks.48
It was quite clear that in most instances separate but equal did not actually mean equal. This fact
served as a starting point for opponents of segregation who exploited it in court. “Separate but
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equal” as doctrine served as a platform for African Americans along and civil rights groups to
attack Jim Crow statutes and the segregated system associated with them.
The assault on segregation began in higher education, because it was a much harder area
for states to prove that separate facilities were equal. Due to the amount resources and capitol
needed to run such institutions it was much hard to provide truly equal accommodations for both
races. The first case of this sort was Missouri ex. Rel Gaines v. Canada decided in 1938. Lloyd
Gaines applied to the law school at the University of Missouri and was not admitted, however it
was not because he was unqualified, but because of a statute prohibiting black students from
attending the institution. The State of Missouri as compensation offered to pay his tuition at
another law school out of state. The Court however sided with Gaines, holding that it was unfair
for a state to provide higher education in state for only one race and not for another.49 Some
states did run completely separate institutions instate such as Texas. However even these were
eventually forced to integrate because segregation in higher education was gradually held
unconstitutional in the cases Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. Okla. decided in 1948,
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents and Sweatt v. Painter both decided in 1950. The end result
of these cases was that “separate but equal” was unconstitutional in higher education because
segregated institutions lacked important academic resources such as libraries and because of
other intangible factors such as isolation from the future professionals in their fields.50 The
holdings in these cases concerning higher education helped pave the way for NAACP lawyers
who would attack segregated education in America in whole in Brown v. Board of Education.
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School expenditures for African Americans did increase in1954, but funding per black
pupil in southern states, “was still only 60 percent of that for southern whites.”51 This statistic
reflects the gross inequalities in public education that were still present during the time of Brown.
The NAACP eventually got tired of arguing that individual segregated institutions were unequal
under the “separate, but equal doctrine” and instead strove for the ultimate goal of destroying the
doctrine itself. NAACP lawyers began Brown v. Board of Education in 1951. The lawyers
sought to break away from the equity arguments that they had been using, and instead returned to
the argument used by Plessy. They argued that segregation enforced in public education was
inherently unequal because it gave black students a feeling of inferiority, which in turn retarded
their motivation to learn. The lawyers employed numerous sociological findings such as those by
Kenneth Clark and Gunnar Myrdal to support their arguments.52
They also argued that the framers of the “New Birth Amendments” had intended to stop
all forms of segregation and that these efforts had been hindered after reconstruction ended and
at the very least “the framers surely had not foreclosed future generations from overturning
segregation, either by congressional action or judicial review.”53 The Brown decision consisted
of 4 different individual cases in Clarendon County South Carolina; Prince Edward County,
Virginia; Wilmington, Delaware; and Topeka Kansas.
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Brown v. Board of Education

Brown v. Board of Education was decided in 1954, and the “separate but equal” doctrine
emanating from Plessy was overturned unanimously in the context public schooling. Chief
Justice Earl Warren wrote the opinion himself, which greatly affected how the ruling was
constructed. He felt that fairness was embodied in the constitution, specifically in the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.54 It was from this simple conviction that Warren
found segregation in schools to be unconstitutional:
I don’t see how in this day and age we can set any group apart from the rest and
say that they are not entitled to exactly the same treatment as others. To do so
would be contrary to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. They
were intended to make slaves equal with all others. Personally, I can’t see how
today we can justify segregation based solely on race.55
Although Chief Justice Warren was firm in his conviction as were some of the other justices on
the Court, there were other such as Justice Reed and entire parts of the country that were not
comfortable with the change.56 Warren was very conscious of this fact and consequently it
greatly shaped how the decision in Brown was phrased and implemented. It prompted the Chief
Justice to convince all of the nine justices that Brown needed to be a unanimous decision written
in one opinion, which it was. In knowing that he and his court were overturning a doctrine that
had shaped American society in a fundamental way, Warren made his opinion easily accessible
to the public. He constructed it so that the average person could understand it by avoiding
technical terms, legalisms, complex Latin and by making it extraordinarily short. The Brown
opinion is only ten pages in length.
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Warren argued a number of different points in his opinion for Brown v. Board of
Education. The first point was that “the Fourteenth Amendment was at best inconclusive at to its
intended affect of public education” because when looking at history it was almost impossible to
know if the public education would have been considered an enumerated right. At the time the
New Birth Amendments were passed public education did not play nearly as large a role in
society as it did during the time of Brown.57 Warren’s next point was that for that reason the
case must be decided not on the role of public education when the 14th Amendment was adopted
but “in the light of the full development of public education and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation.”58 Warren claimed that in this context the founders of the amendment
would have considered public education an enumerated right.
Many have argued that the Court had no power to practically add and enumerated right to
the constitution.59 This is definitely a reasonable argument considering that the court was acting
of its own accord with out the total support of Congress, the Executive Branch or public consent.
However I do not feel the need to diverge on this tangent because the court did do just this.
American society has adjusted to the verdict in Brown and to the perception that segregation is
unconstitutional. Therefore there is no point in discussing if the court was wrong or not because
Brown is much to far in the past.
Because the Court felt that public education was now to be considered an enumerated
right public education it would have to be “equal on all terms.”60 Warren then turned to
segregation stating that, “Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
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detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the
law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
Negro group.”61 To support this assertion the Court famously relied the on the social experiments
presented by the NAACP lawyers in the now infamous footnote 11. It is unclear how much
weight Warren intended to give to these studies in his reasoning. Today they are quite
controversial in terms their accuracy, but at the time were considered cutting edge. Because they
were not nearly so disputed in time of Brown it seemed that it had declared segregated schools
inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional specifically because of these findings. The
point was not that racial classification was wrong in itself. It did not rule all segregation
unconstitutional such as miscegenation laws, only segregation in schooling because these social
studies proved that it denoted feeling of inferiority to African Americans.
David Armor in his work Forced Justice labels the reasoning that the court used “the
harm and benefit thesis.” He claims that whether on purpose or not, by relying on social science
studies to support its claim in Brown the Court endorsed this reasoning.62 The social studies that
support that the reasoning and the theory it self have both changed greatly since Brown. The
theory has become very complex and significantly more controversial, but at the time of the
decision it was relatively simple. It had two basic points, one positive, and one negative:
The first component holds that segregated schools harm the education and
academic achievement of minority children, in part by reinforcing negative
stereotypes and damaging personal self-esteem. The second component is a
reasonable corollary to the first: Desegregation benefits the self-esteem, academic
achievement, and long-term educational and occupational outcomes for minority
children while improving race relations for everyone63
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I am not going to say that this reasoning is correct or necessarily true. The argument to support
this theory has greatly changed overtime and theory is far less dogmatized than it was for many
years after Brown. It is a debatable whether the Court meant to adopt it in Brown or was simply
trying to use social science as a side note to give more legitimacy to it decision overturn school
segregation. Armor argues is undeniable that by employing social science Brown gave this
theory an “enormous boost elevating it from academic theory to moral authority.”64 On this point
I have to agree with him. By seeming to rely heavily on findings from social science in such a
short opinion, whether it meant to or not the Court put itself in a position that implied that
integration was its necessary end.
Brown II was delivered in 1955 to instruct the school districts on what they needed to do.
In this resolution the court did not specify that school districts needed to dispose of their dual
system. Only that black plaintiffs should be admitted to schools on a nondiscriminatory basis,
free from legal constraints that took account of their race. This was not the same thing as forcing
states to have racially mixed schools. Only that all statutes which denied black plaintiffs to
schools specifically on their account of their race should be removed. The Court did not state
whether it was requiring schools to desegregate or not. It only declared statutes that explicitly
segregated schools unconstitutional, not necessarily the racially segregated school system itself.
The Court decided that because Brown effected so many different localities the “School
authorities [would] have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these
problems; courts [would] have to consider whether the action of school authorities constituted
good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.”65 It essentially gave the
district courts the responsibility of making sure the districts eventually transferred to a
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“nondiscriminatory system.” In working with the districts the courts could “take into account the
public interest” in the transition period. To induce this change the local courts could alter a
couple aspects of a district:
…The courts may consider, problems related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial
basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in
solving the foregoing problems.66
The Court stated that the school systems should be made to admit students on a nonracial
basis but did not say what a non-discriminatory basis actually meant.67 It was unclear exactly
what objectives it was pursuing in Brown II. The Court offered little guidance concerning to the
action it expected to happen after its decision, its objective was vague, and the means it
prescribed to achieve this objective were also equivocal and poorly defined.
Neither Brown I nor Brown II addressed whether districts actually needed to integrate
their schools or were just barred from explicitly using race to prevent Blacks from going to
school with Whites. It is possible that the court thought that by removing such statutes Southern
school districts would desegregate on their own. This would be naïve if one remembers that these
same Southern states were so hostile to Congress’s attempts to dispose of the black codes during
reconstruction. Congress during Reconstruction was resolved that it would to go to great lengths
to secure the rights it had established for blacks. The Supreme Court by comparison was
indecisive and soft in its judgment considering the magnitude of its decision. It appeared that it
was not going require states to actually integrate. As previously articulated integration was the
necessary end of the reasoning it used to declare segregation in public education
unconstitutional.
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In his article “Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” Herbert Wechsler
criticizes the reasoning used in the argument in the Brown decision. He makes a similar point,
that the Court by declaring segregation unconstitutional because of harm inflicted on African
Americans necessarily put itself in a difficult position.68 He reduced Brown to a matter of
association, “… If the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an
association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.”69 Wechsler was critical of the
reasoning in Brown because he noted that by its argument Brown necessarily would require
forced integration. This forced integration is necessary as remedying past intentional
discrimination.”70 One of the interests compelling enough for Chief Justice Robert’s, Wechsler
felt that if the court was going use this reasoning it would in turn have to be fairly clear as to
what changes it was going to force on society,71 something that it did not do.
Wechsler argued that it would have been far more advantageous for the Court to adopt
an anti-classificationist position that simply forbade all racial guidelines in legislation on the
basis of freedom of association. This reasoning would not require the integration of schools.
Instead it would only require school districts to drop explicitly racial statutes. It would be neutral
because the decision would not allow statutes that excluded Blacks, but would not require that
they go to school with Whites.
I do not adopt Wechsler’s position that it would have been better to adopt an anticlassificationist argument, but I do think that his critique of Brown is accurate and serves to
elucidate the problems with the reasoning the court invoked to end segregation in education. The
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decision stated that legally segregated schools were harmful to African-Americans academically
and therefore was unconstitutional accordingly. The end of this reasoning would necessarily be
to force integration because going to school separately was unconstitutional. It declared the
segregated school system of the South unjust and unacceptable because of it effects, but did not
say what should go in its place. The Court in its decision implied that integration would be
necessary but gave no guidelines as to how this integration should occur. It in this way dug itself
into hole because in Brown I its reasoning seemingly suggested integration as an end. However
Brown II apparently did not specify that its goal was integration even though this was the logical
end to the courts reasoning.
Some have attributed the ambiguity and vagueness of the Court’s in Brown to it being
considerate of the Southern and border states. The Court knew that it was singling out an entire
region of the country and condemning its practices when many of the northern state’s school
systems were highly segregated, although not by law. It was also aware that it was reversing a
way of life that had prevailed since reconstruction and was thus aware that the decision might
invoke a massive backlash such as the one that occurred after the Civil War when “the New
Birth Amendments” were passed. Whatever the case it was particularly ambiguous concerning
how the decision should affect the school districts involved. For this reason during the first 15
years following the Brown decision the Southern schools saw little change in their racial make
up and remained segregated although not by law. The Southern states tried as hard as they
possibly could to prevent change in the system that that they found so important to their way of
life. They resisted desegregation through a number of strategies both in government and
bureaucratic policy and in private actions.

35
The South After Brown

The first of these techniques was to simply interpret Brown in a manner that did not
require the districts to desegregate. In 1955 the 4th circuit court discussed the case Briggs v.
Elliott one of the 5 cases in Brown which was concerning Clarendon County South Carolina. In
this case Judge John Parker invoked what became known as the “Briggs Dictum” which became
the motto of the South:
It [the supreme court] has not decided that the states must mix persons of different
races in the schools or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them
of the right to choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided…is that a
state may not deny any person on account of race the right to attend any school
that it maintains…if the schools which it maintains are open to children of all
races, no violation of the constitution is involved even though the children of
different races voluntarily attend different schools…the Constitution, in other
words does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.72
Thus Southern schools did not have to actually integrate they simply had to remove racially
discriminatory statutes, even if the point of the statute was to propagate segregation. For the
decade after Brown this dictum reigned supreme in how Southern school boards went about
postponing desegregation their schools almost more vehemently than before Brown. It was clear
during this stretch that they had not intention of giving African Americans any remedies.
The states instituted massive amount of legislation to make sure that sure that their school
districts remained either black and or white. The motto was if “we can legislate, we can
segregate.”73 One method was to simply legislate against integration. For example Mississippi
and Louisiana made it illegal for children to attend schools that had both Black and Whites and
Georgia had statute that made it illegal for a public official to allocate funds to any school that
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was desegregated. The states also invoked laws that forbade teachers from being associated with
the NAACP. Along with this legislation, states appropriated large sums of money to attorneys to
combat the NAACP. These attorneys thought up numerous strategies under the motto “all
deliberate delay” which exhausted the NAACP and drained much of its resources.
Some of the primary strategies that school districts employed, to perpetuate segregation
were “pupil placement laws.” These were statutes that perpetuated black and white school
assignments although not using race but rather a complex evaluation psychological and academic
performance. These mandated that school districts had to take account of a certain set of criteria,
usually “student preparation, aptitude, morals of conducts, health and personal standards”74 in
assigning students to schools. The plans were so effective that they made it almost impossible for
black students to attend white schools, for example, “ under Virginia’s law, school authorities
considered hundreds of thousands of placements without discovering one black student qualified
to be in a white school.”75
Districts also utilized “freedom of choice plans” which actually did allow African
American parents to send their children to any school of their choice. This on paper was fair,
however parents would have to decide if attending a white school was best for their children or
even their families. Many white communities resorted to private scare techniques similar to those
invoked during reconstruction. KKK membership surged during these years and white on black
crime greatly increased, “between 1954 and 1959 there were 210 recorded acts of white violence
against black people in the south, including six murders, twenty nine assaults with fire arms,
forty-four beatings and sixty bombings”76 Along with these violent groups there were others that
were non-violent known as “White Citizens Councils” which focused on economic forms of
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intimidation. These groups focused on deterring people from joining the NAACP and African
Americans from voting or sending their children to white schools. If some one did one of these
things the citizens council would try to make sure that they were denied mortgages and medical
insurance or laid off from their professions. By 1957 the group had an estimated 250,000
members.77 It was estimated that from 1955-1957 NAACP membership dropped from 130,000 to
80,000.78 It was obvious that the South had no “ good faith” in implementing non-discriminatory
racial school assignments and had no intention of moving forward with “all deliberate speed” but
rather was trying to do the exact opposite.
In 1966 sociologist James Coleman did a report for the U.S. Office of Education funded
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Its purpose was to assess the equality of individuals in the
nations education system on account of race. The report was named Equality of Educational
Opportunity and was the largest survey and study of that kind for it time. The reports are now
considered controversial as to their accuracy and effectiveness,79 but at the time reflected how
minimal an effect Brown v. Board of Education had on African American’s students. David
Armor summarizes these conclusions:
‐
‐

‐

77

Twelve years after Brown, the overwhelming majority of white students
attended predominately white schools and a majority of black students
attended schools that were majority black.
Contrary to expectations, within regions of the country the distribution of
school facilities and resources---expenditures, teacher-background,
equipment, textbooks---were largely equal between black and white
schools, and where there were differences, they tended to be small and
could favor blacks or whites.
The academic achievement of blacks lagged substantially behind whites
at all grade levels, and the small differences in school resources

James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 99.
78
Numan Bartley, Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950’s (Louisiana:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969) 114.
79
David J. Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995) 66.

38

‐

contributed very little to these achievement differences; however the
achievement levels of both blacks and whites were strongly associated
with the socioeconomic characteristics of their families
Black students in desegregated schools had higher achievement levels
than black students in predominately black schools, although this
difference was reduced substantially when family socioeconomic levels
were taken into account (that is blacks in desegregated schools were
from families with more education, income and so forth)80

It was clear the Brown had accomplished little in terms of remedying the harm that had been
inflicted upon blacks. All that had happened was that the race had been in dicta removed from
the laws that forbade Blacks from going to school with Whites. True there were a few token
cases where black students went to predominately white schools, however the majority of the
country remained segregated and Whites academic performance was still significantly ahead of
Blacks.
The Court was in some ways at a crossroads. It needed to reflect on whether this was the
result that it had intended in when it decided Brown. Was this the change that it had meant to
invoke for race in public education? The nation was in the middle of the civil rights movement
and the legitimacy of all forms of legally enforced segregation and inequality were being
vehemently attacked. The Court joined in and made the decision to proceed from Brown and
began to walk down the path towards desegregation. For the next 20 years it would work to
establish an education system that was fully desegregated. Over these 20 years it would have to
clarify what this new system should look like and more importantly how it should be achieved
and what means it would use. The next chapter will cover what techniques the court would
require, accept and forbid districts to use in integrating both the nation’s public education
systems. I will show in the cases following Brown that the Court firstly did intend to destroy all
vestiges the dual system and would accept and in some cases require, numerous strategies to
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achieve this goal. A state pursuing this end today would be trying to prevent racially identifiable
schools, the issue in Parents Involved.

40
Chapter 3

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Public Education

Brown I and Brown II did not significantly alter the racially polarized quality of
America’s school system during the later part 1950’s and early 1960’s. The obligation to
desegregate was placed on the school districts and was to be enforced by the district courts. The
Brown II decision was extremely vague in what it actually sought to accomplish. Was it trying to
eliminate the dual school system? Or simply forbid statutes that made school assignments on
explicitly racial and discriminatory basis? Whatever Warren and the rest of the Court’s intentions
were in the decision, ten years after Brown public education had changed little in the South. All
deliberate speed apparently meant the pace of “an extraordinarily arthritic snail. ”81 Ten years
after the decision only 2.3% of Blacks in the South attended schools with any white students.
However, there was another offensive that actually sought to desegregate all of American society
and did not come from the Court or NAACP, but the federal government.
On July 2, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to rid American society of
segregation and racial discrimination. Congress and the Executive now joined the Supreme Court
under the contention that segregation was an ill that had to be removed as soon as possible. It did
not only apply to public education, but all public accommodations such as restaurants, hotels, gas
stations, theater etc.82 It was not just a group of nine judges and a few civil rights lawyers, but the
entire federal government of the United States government backing this goal. Desegregation was
now an inevitable reality that the south and the rest of the country had to face.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had a large impact on how public school districts could
desegregate. Before the act many districts had considerable leeway in their plans, which often
meant that their plans didn’t have any intention of actually desegregating at all. The Civil Rights
Act intensified the pressure applied to these districts through an influx of legislation. First and
foremost if gave the department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) the large
responsibility of establishing guidelines for Southern desegregation, which were finalized in
1965. These guidelines were much tougher and clearer than many of the previous court orders.83
The guidelines stated that for a plan to be acceptable it would have to, “… actually be working to
eliminate the dual school structure… to the extent to which Negro or other minority students
have in fact transferred from segregated schools.”84 Thus the guidelines actually forced schools
to adopt plans, which would actually desegregate even though this was in itself unclear because
it did not specify how many blacks should be transferred for a school to be considered
desegregated.
To make sure that states complied with these guidelines, HEW and the Justice
Department were given two different powers. The first was that the Attorney General and the
Justice Department could bring class action lawsuits against school districts if local parents or
groups complained of racial discrimination. This would bring legitimate government litigation,
which wielded much more power than the NAACP possibly could. This in turn took a lot of
pressure off the district judges and the NAACP who until that point had been the only agents
responsible for enforcing desegregation in the South.
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The other power, which Congress created to force states into compliance, was the ability
to cut off federal funding for any school district that failed to meet the HEW guidelines.85 The
possibility that a district would have its funding terminated was definitely a powerful symbolic
gesture of federal government’s resolution to force the districts to desegregate. However it was
actually rather ineffectual for practical reasons. The first of these was that to cut off funds the
actions of the districts actions would have to be deemed unjustifiable in court. This litigation
took a long time because “funds could not be terminated until there was a hearing, which
included and express finding of non-compliance entered in the record and notice to the affected
party of failure to comply, and until attempts at securing voluntary compliance had broke
down.”86 Not only would litigation take a long time, but federal funding did not make up a large
percent of a school district’s budget, as Wilkinson notes it only amounted to “8 percent of the
average school district budget, much less than the state or local share.”87 Thus if a school district
wanted to snub HEW guidelines and federal funding it was not out of the question, but rather
quite feasible. In fact by August 1967 only 25 school districts had come back in compliance with
the HEW guidelines after termination hearings and 55 simply accepted being ineligible for
federal aid.88 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had its flaws, it showed that all three
branches of government were now one on the opinion that southern segregation needed to be
disposed of. The stage was set the state for the Supreme Court to further elucidate the ideal it
first asserted in Brown, but was so unequivocal about in Brown II.
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Green

Desegregation orders occurred in most school districts of the South, but most of the
attention in terms of enforcement focused on large urban districts with the hope that other rural
districts would follow voluntarily. However many rural districts did not, and remained highly
segregated by instituting freedom of choice plans and utilizing pupil placement legislation. This
was the case with Kent County in eastern Virginia, which operated only two schools in the entire
county, New Kent and George W. Watkins which both served grades kindergarten through eight.
Although the county was highly integrated with no residential segregation the schools remained
segregated after the Brown:
Racial identification of the systems schools was complete, extending not just to
the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school
operations - faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.
In short, the State, acting through the local school board and school officials,
organized and operated a dual system, part "White" and part "Negro."89
There was no residential racial segregation in the district. If the district had simply assigned
students based on proximity, neither of the schools would have been racially identifiable.
However the district maintained two separate schools one white, and one black through a system
of busing. The district was complying with the desegregation order with a “choice plan” in which
a student could transfer in every grade except for first and eighth. However for a while after
Brown, the district had a series of pupil placement statutes that made it very difficult for an
actual transfer to happen. These pupil placement laws were removed by 1966, when the new
HEW guidelines arrived, but by1967 only 15 percent of black students attended the
predominantly white school and no white students attended the totally black school.
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In this case The Court took the opportunity to clarify what its actual intent was in Brown
II. It made clear that creating a unitary school system was its final goal and thus banished the
“Brigg’s Dictum” along with the dual school system. In a considerably short decision it
explained that the racially identifiable schools that were being propagated by the Kent County
School District were precisely the result it had not intended in Brown II and was in fact the exact
opposite. Justice Brennan in his opinion explained that Brown II had required school districts "to
effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system, "90 Which “was a call for
the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness.”91 The only reason
why school boards were permitted to continue operating segregated schools after Brown II was
because the Court had realized how difficult it would be for a district to effectuate such a
transition. This is why it had simply required “good faith implementation” and “with all
deliberate speed.”
The Court seemed to finally acknowledge that the logic it had invoked in Brown, that the
racially polarized school system negatively effected African American’s academic performance,
and consequently that this school system which characterized most of the South had to be
dismantled. Although New Kent no longer had laws restricting African Americans and Whites
from attending either school, both schools were identifiable in every aspect as black and white.
This was not due to specific statutes, but to the freedom of choice plan which allowed the
segregation to continue. Brennan and the rest of the Court in Green denounced this passive
technique, which did not force children to integrate asserting that from now on districts would be
forced to adopt plans that had a “promise of aiding a desegregation program to effectuate
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conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system.”92 From this point
forward African Americans and Whites had to attend the same schools together. Although the
Court did not declare freedom of choice plans impermissible it did in the case of New Kent
County where geographical zoning would have been very effective. What it was most clear on
was the fact that desegregation was its final goal and that any plan that did not actually seek to
achieve that end was unacceptable.
After Brown I the Court never again relied on social studies to legitimate its belief that
segregated schools negatively affected African American students academically. Its dedication in
Green and the consequent decisions, which forced school districts such as Kent County to
dispose of their racially identifiable schools, affirmed that it had accepted that complete school
desegregation was its final goal. In the case of New Kent there were no longer any laws
maintaining the segregation in the school system, it was simply just a fact. The Court asserted
that there was no other choice of action, schools must desegregate and eliminate the dual school.
This meant not simply removing racial classifications from statutes, but forcing association
between the two races. What remained was for it to define exactly what extent a district’s
schools would need to integrate to be considered desegregated and what specific steps would be
necessary to achieve this.

Swann

Three years later it would clarify both of these issue in the famous Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, which dealt with what methods and burdens a district court
could impose on a school board. It specifically discussed how quotas could be used, the
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existence of racially identifiable schools and how race could be used in school assignments with
respect to zoning and transportation. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system during the time
of the decision was the 43rd largest in the country. In its 550 square mile area were some 84,000
pupils, including some 24,000 blacks. Before 1968 the system had operated a desegregation plan
that utilized a mixture of zoning and “free choice” for public school assignments. After a couple
of formal complaints from local African Americans that the plan was ineffective and the decision
in Green, the district court reviewed the plan and concluded that it indeed “fell short”93 of
achieving a unified school system now required. The district was residentially segregated
because a large majority of the districts African Americans lived in its northwestern part. In June
1969 21,000 of the total 24,000 black students went to schools in this region and two thirds of
those students attended all black schools.94 It was clear that the desegregation plan was not
achieving unitary schools and that geographic zoning and “free choice” techniques employed by
the district were ineffective because of the predominately black neighborhoods in the North
West. The district court ordered the board to create a new plan that would actually be effective.
The school board failed to present a completed plan to the district court and in response it
hired sociologist Dr. John Finger to create one for it. In 1970 Finger presented a plan known as
“the Finger Plan” and school board in response presented another known as “the Board Plan.”
The two plans were fairly similar with respect to how each dealt with high schools and middle
schools. Both treated the highly black residential area as the centre of a circle and then divide
said circle like pieces of a pie so that smaller parts of the highly segregated neighborhood would
have access via busing to the more rural parts of the city.95 However the plans differed greatly on
the issue of elementary schools. The Board Plan amounted to simple gerrymandering, “more
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than half of the Negro elementary pupils were left in nine schools that were 86% to 100% Negro;
approximately half of the white elementary pupils were assigned to schools 86% to 100%
white.”96 The Finger Plan went much farther than The Board Plan in this respect and instituted
numerous pairing, grouping and rezoning techniques that would result 9%-36% African
American in most of the elementary schools.97 The district court in response adopted The Board
Plan for high school and middle schools, but The Finger Plan for elementary schools.
Both of these plans would assign students to schools on a racial basis. Each school in the
district needed to somewhat reflect the demographics of the district as whole. In other words
each school had a quota for how many blacks and whites could attend. Instead of attending the
schools closest to their homes pupils were assigned based on their race so that all the schools met
the quota. Students, both black and white were forced to take long bus rides every morning
which were all paid for by the city. Even though desegregation was done with the purpose of
improving the quality of education for both African, the busing plan in Swann put an extremely
high premium on it because of the weight that it placed pupils for that purpose.
The district argued that the court was overstepping its authority in terms of the types of
remedies it could be forced to adopt. The board felt that the plan the district court was forcing
upon it presented an “unreasonable burden on the systems pupils” particularly on those in its
elementary schools. This was the issue the Supreme Court had to resolve. The Supreme Court
did not agree that it was unreasonable. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Burger
the Court clarified what techniques a district court could impose on a school board in order to
assuredly effectuate the transition to a unitary school district. It is important to note that the
decision says very little about what types of plans the district could adopt voluntarily, rather it
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only covered what plans the district could be forced to adopt finding a violation of the 14th
Amendment. It would seem logical that the district itself could adopt measures that the even the
district court could not impose. The distinction between forced and voluntary action is crucial to
Parents Involved and I will discuss it at length later on.
The first and in many ways most important findings that the Court declared in Swann
was that district could be forced to use racial quotas in assigning students to schools. It was very
clear that districts could be forced to use racial quotas to reflect the demographics of the district
as a starting point in creating unitary schools:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and
implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order
to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities. As with any equity case the nature of
the violation determines the scope of the remedy. In default by the school
authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has
broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary system.98
The Court the was not stating that this would necessarily make a school district unified or that
every school district schools always needed to reflect the proportions of the district as whole to
be considered desegregated. Rather it was a simple suggestion that it could be a useful starting
point. It was not an “inflexible requirement.”99 It was simply stating that the school districts did
have this power and that if they did not attempt to comply with desegregation the district court
would then subsume such power and force whatever plans it felt necessary on them.
The board tried to argue that the district court could not impose a policy that used quota.
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has a clause which states that, “desegregation shall not
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mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.”100
This clause on it face seems to suggest that racial balancing is a violation of Title IV. The Court
argued however that the clause was intended to prevent district courts from imposing
desegregation orders on districts that had racial imbalances not of their own making. Chief
Justice Burger clarified this position stating that in writing Title IV Congress was primarily
concerned, “ that the Act might be read as creating a right of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment in the situation of so-called "de facto segregation," where racial imbalance exists in
the schools, but with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state
authorities.” It was unconstitutional for the federal government or a district court to force a
district to integrate absent a violation, but not if that district had a desegregation order.
This is not the position that the Robert’s court took, which is that school boards
themselves could not take this route voluntarily absent a previous violation. It is simply that
districts were not obligated to maintain desegregation measure absent a constitutional violation.
This implied that once a district had achieved unitary status, meaning it had fully eliminated all
vestiges of previous its segregation practices, annual adjustments in school composition are not
required and “further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.”101 Nowhere in
Title IV or anywhere else for that matter is there any clause that explicitly states that a school
board cannot voluntarily adopt a quota. This is the issue in the Parents Involved, whether a
school board voluntarily can integrate its schools using race as a decisive factor.
The Court was clear that one-race schools were constitutional as long as they did result
from school board actions implemented with the intention of propagating segregation. It had
already acknowledged that there were forces in society that could create de facto segregation
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such as the residential housing patterns in the northwestern portion of the city. As long as this
segregation was purely de facto, a school district would not have to adjust to it. This is not to say
that the Court did not think that de facto segregation was not just as detrimental as de jure, only
that a district was not obligated to eliminate it because it had not created it.
The Court was expanded on what it felt could be considered de jure segregation into
policies and other actions, not just statutory segregation. It explained that if a board wanted to it
could work with de facto segregation to keep schools racially identifiable. Some districts such as
Charlotte-Mecklenburg had closed schools in areas in which they were likely to become racially
mixed after desegregation or conversely opened up new ones in areas where the school was
bound to be one race because that geographic zone lacked diversity:
People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the
needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of innercity neighborhoods… In the past, choices in this respect have been used as a potent
weapon for creating or maintaining a state-segregated school system… such a policy…
may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with
"neighborhood zoning," further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the
races.102
This was an important point because the Supreme Court suggested that school boards could be
held responsible for continuing segregation or producing it with out statutes, but rather other
methods such as careful geographic planning. It acknowledged a certain degree of responsibility
belonged to school boards if their actions were done for the purpose of segregating. If a school
board acted in this fashion it would now be held accountable for those racially identifiable
schools. This would serve as the basis for the verdict in Keyes decided two years later, which
extended desegregation orders to states that were never had any statutory segregation.
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The Court realized that using geographic zoning and choice plans might not be effective
in situations where segregation had been maintained through these types of techniques that
worked with de facto segregation. For this reason the court expanded the types of measures that a
school district could be required to use. The court did acknowledge that there were limits to what
extent a district court could force a school board to make school assignments that were based
purely on race, but also was crystal clear that it could prescribe a large variety of remedies if it
felt they were necessary for desegregation:
…all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and
maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be
administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may
impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in
the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual
school system.103
This statement does not explicitly express considerations of race, but what Burger means by
“impose burdens on some” means taking race into account and assigning burdens on that
basis.104 In this context he was referring to busing elementary students long distances because
they were a certain race. Where segregation had been maintained by numerous methods, not just
through state imposed statutes, a vast number of techniques might be necessary to provide a
remedy. To achieve the end school districts could take account of race in school assignments.
Burger does even specify that this could be done only as a last resort.
Swann did not revolve around what a school board could do on its own rather what a
district court could force it to do if it did not try to desegregate. It did not address what methods
were restricted to the school board only the district court. However what it allowed the district
court to do in this context was quite a lot, it would be conceivable that the school districts if they
felt it necessary would have had even more lee-way in creating measures effectively destroy their
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dual systems. In Green it had stated that the intent of Brown II was to create a unified school
district. It had now in Swann illustrated a light conception of what a unified school district would
look like and more importantly what measures a school board could be forced to take.

Keyes

Things would get more complicated two years after in the Keyes decision, which erased a
large part of the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Although it was not the last
Supreme Court case that expanded the desegregation decree, Keyes v. School District NO.1,
Denver, Colo. is the last great leap the Supreme Court was willing to take in it commitment to
desegregate public schools. It expanded its definition of de jure segregation from declaring
school districts that had explicitly racial segregation statutes to any school board policy that had
intentionally perpetuated and created segregation. Districts that were never by law segregated
could now be forced to desegregate. It was the final step to the full realization of Brown, all
intentional forms of government segregation had to be removed and remedied no matter was its
form.
Although the city of Denver had never been segregated and had a relatively clean track
record of race relations, by 1969 certain parts of the district had become highly segregated
particularly the Park Hill area and the core district located downtown. To combat the growing
segregation the school district adopted the “Noel Resolution” which instituted a mandatory
transfer system where blacks and white were bused to different schools. However this plan
offended the city’s Whites, which made up 66% of the cities total population, with African
Americans at 14% and Hispanics at 20%. When elections took place the following year a new
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school board was reelected and rescinded the “Noel Resolution.”105 Black parents filed suit and
more plans were brought up, but were denied by the district court which felt that a system wide
desegregation plan was to large for the harm committed. In essence it felt that the plan exceeded
detriment inflicted by the board. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the decision and
eventually voted 7-1 that the situation required a system wide busing remedy.
A system wide desegregation plan could be made mandatory even though its segregative
policies may have only been employed in parts of the district. It found that the school board had
employed a couple of measures that created a dual school system such as, zoning which resulted
in one race schools, building new schools in racially identifiable areas, using mobile classrooms
to oversubscribe schools and the assignment of staff and transportation on a “racially identifiable
basis.”106 The Court stated that because of the school board’s practices in Park Hill it was “both
fair and reasonable to require that the school authorities bear the burden of showing that their
actions as to other segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by segregative
intent.”107 Its reasoning was that if one part of the district had been found guilt of segregation it
should also be responsible for proving that all of its other racially identifiable schools were
created with race neutral intentions. Desegregation was that important of an end.
The district could not prove that the racially identifiable schools in the core part of the
city were not because of the school board’s actions, which is the reason why The Court allowed
for a district wide busing system not just one for the Park Hill neighborhood. One large
acknowledgement that the court made in this case, which is often overlooked, is its definition of
a disadvantaged racial minority:
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…though of different origins, Negroes and Hispanics in Denver suffer identical
discrimination in treatment when compared with the treatment afforded Anglo
students. In that circumstance, we think petitioners are entitled to have schools
with a combined predominance of Negroes and Hispanics included in the
category of "segregated" schools.108
This is an important acknowledgement because it affords the benefits to the harm inflicted not
just on African Americans who suffered segregation by law, but also other minority groups
which had not. This pronouncement runs contrary to the anti-classification position that the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees neutrality and protects individual rights. It draws attention to
fact that entire groups have suffered from society and for that reason need special solicitude as
entire groups.
Keyes initiated a wave of desegregation that expanded out of the South and into many
districts in Northern states, which had never had segregation statutes such as Massachusetts,
Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska and Ohio. It made desegregation not just a Southern
movement, but one that encompassed the entire nation. It represents the pinnacle of the Supreme
Court’s commitment to desegregating the nations public schools.
The first 10 years after Brown had little effect on segregation in the South and did little
more than remove explicitly racial provisions from statutes and the states were thus able to
perpetuate the segregation by a mixture of state policy and private insurgency. The Green
decision marked a turning point in the significance of Brown and the word desegregation for
American society. It proved that the Supreme Court did intend to follow through on its apparent
promise in Brown to remedy that harm that was inflicted on African Americans by making the
elimination of racially identifiable schools a policy objective for school boards and the district
court, not just dictum. Swann set guidelines and limits to the measures that a school board could
adopt and in many ways expressed how salient the elimination of racial identifiable school was
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to the Court. In this decision school districts could be forced to adopt plans that would assign it
students on an explicitly racial basis for quotas. Finally the Keyes decision illustrated that the
Court was not only trying to get rid of state mandated segregation, but all segregation that had
been inflicted by school districts. This decision also recognized that African Americans were not
the only minorities, which could be subject to discriminatory practices.
The Courts commitment to desegregation over the years has not diminished since these
cases. It has been quite clear that desegregating racially identifiable public schools if they are in
any way attributable to prior intention is a must. To achieve this goal the court has often
compelled school boards to adopt means such as busing, which assign students to schools on
explicitly racial terms and bus them accordingly. Even if a school board was only minimally
responsible for that racial imbalance it was still forced to eliminate all vestiges of that prior
imbalance. The Court was clear that once a school had acquired unitary status, meaning that it
had fully disposed its dual school system and all of the racially identifiable schools associated
with it, it would not be obligated to maintain racially balancing or maintain quotas. The Court’s
insistence on explicitly racial measures for even the smallest infractions suggests that it did view
integrated schools as an extremely desirable goal. In my opinion it would be logical to infer that
if a school board could be forced to adopt such measures for relatively minimal infractions it
would also seem that a school board could voluntarily pursue this goal by employing similar
means for the goal of maintaining a school system that relatively reflects the overall district. This
is what both Seattle and Louisville were doing in Parents Involved, voluntarily creating racially
balanced schools. I will return to this point later, but now would like to turn to the topic
“affirmative action” and the way the court has dealt with cases concerning it.
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Chapter 4

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Job Discrimination

President Kennedy first used the words “affirmative action” in their current sense in
executive order 10925. In this order he asserted that the government should make sure that it and
the businesses associated with it, such as contractors, should create equal opportunity for
minorities in the U.S. He stated that, “…contractor[s] will take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to
their race, creed, color or national origin.”109 Kennedy along with vice president Johnson and his
administration dedicated a large amount of effort in their term to promoting equality for
minorities in the U.S. One of their largest tasks associated with this goal was promoting equality
in the work place.
In 1960 job discrimination like school segregation before Brown was fact of life for
African Americans, and it had an equal if not greater impact on their lives. The average income
for a white family at that time was around $5,800, for a black family it was only $3,200.110 This
was because the majority of employed blacks worked menial and labor jobs, which was at least
partially attributable to differences in education mentioned previously.111 From the 1950’s to the
1960’s black owned business declined by a third, the number or self employed blacks declined
by 10,000 and the unemployment rate remained double that for whites. A large reason for
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Black’s high unemployment rate and lack of income was because of work place discrimination.
Many unions, business and training programs would not hire or allow minorities to participate.
The administration’s first step was to eliminate discrimination in employment practices.
It at first seemed that the administration like the Court for the ten years that followed Brown was
simply trying to make sure that hiring practices were completely race neutral. Many of JFK’s
orders similar to 10925 did not stipulate that there was a set number for how many minorities
should be hired. Rather most simply asserted that discrimination should be eliminated, defining
discrimination as “refusing to hire people because of their race, color or creed.”112 This was
fairly general, it did not articulate what determined discriminatory practices. Did this mean not
hiring entire minority groups based on that fact alone? Or did it mean that it was wrong to make
a decision on two equal candidate based on their race? From this point of view it would appear
that the administration wanted to simply remove the explicit nature of job discrimination in a
similar way that Brown had removed the legality of school segregation. It did not explicitly
suggest that it was trying to increase minority representation in employment.
In 1964 as stated previously the government pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ending all
legal segregation and eliminating all forms discrimination in government funded programs under
Title VI.113 The act also contained Title VII, which, forbade discrimination in all forms of
employment according to “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”114 It gave courts the
power to enforce the title and order remedies such as reinstatement of employment with backpay and other equitable relief excluding punitive damages. However it did state that businesses
were allowed to institute different standards for hiring based on seniority or merit as well as skill
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tests to find the best candidates. In constructing Title VII the administration was careful not to
use quotas because Kennedy among others felt that it was too volatile of an issue and stated in
one of its clauses that they were not permissible. Title VII also established the Equal
Employment and Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was in charge of enforcing
compliance with the clauses of Title VII in the nation. This agency could investigate business,
hiring practices, and mediate disputes. Title VII and the EEOC were extremely significant as
they expressed the federal government’s dedication to eliminating desegregation in the work
place and creating equal opportunities for African American and other minorities.
Although Title VII was monumental, its effects after 1964 were not perceptible and
changed relatively little in terms of the opportunities that were accessible to African Americans.
It was instituted in a gradual manner, which began in 1965 with all business that had 100
employees and did not apply to businesses with less than 25 workers until 1968.115 Only 40
percent of the total work force consisted of businesses that had 25 or more employees leaving 60
percent unaffected by the decision. Too avoid hiring minorities many businesses invoked skill
tests in a similar way as pupil placement statutes used in the South during school desegregation
to maintain discriminatory practices. The seniority clause made it so that the last hired was the
first fired meaning that most of the minorities that were recently been hired during the previous
years according to the administrations requirements were fired.
EEOC also was not nearly as effective as anticipated. EEOC could investigate complaints
and mediate disputes, but could not utilize punitive measure or even issue “cease and desists
orders.” Also until that point the government and most businesses did not keep track of the
number of minority workers they employed. Civil rights groups had made sure that there was no
national database existed so that southern states could not bar black from jobs. There was no way
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to know if a corporation was complying or not, especially because the administration had
resisted using quotas or numerical ratios compliance criteria. Thus the act was passed, but it had
little effect in terms of actually increasing jobs for blacks and other minorities, and even in some
sense got in the way.

True Affirmative Action

The riots of 1966 and 1967 in San Francisco, Cleveland, Dayton, Newark and Detroit
illustrated how angry Blacks were with their present stake in the nation’s jobs. Studies such as
the one conducted by Illinois governor Otto Kerner (The Kerner Report) concluded that the riots
were due black’s frustration with institutional racism116, which African Americans believed was
the cause of their lack of jobs. The report concluded that “The more educated, the more
experienced, and the more integrated the Negro labor force becomes the less tension and the
fewer problems would occur.”117 Reports such as these shifted the government’s goal from
eliminating work place discrimination to instead simply integrating the American work force so
that more minorities had jobs. This change of goals resulted in what is now known as
“affirmative action.”
Starting with the construction industry the federal government began establishing dates to
correct the deficiencies of minority representation in America’s work force. Starting in the Nixon
administration the Federal Government began arranging “targets” or “goals” which were pretty
much a mixture of loose quota’s combined with timetables to makes sure businesses integrated
their work forces. These methods or mandates were the plans what one now thinks of as
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affirmative action and by 1970 all businesses and unions that accepted $50,000 or more in
federal contracts had to have affirmative action plans in place. Anderson in his book The Pursuit
of Fairness describes one of these plans as it was applied to sheet metal workers:
Sheet metal workers…had 1 percent minorities in 1969; because of retirements
and attrition it hired about 10 percent new workers annually. That union could
qualify for a contract if it made “ a good faith effort” to have between 4 and 8
percent minorities by the end of 1970, escalating to between 19 to 23 percent by
the end of 1973. Thus the union was in compliance. If it did not comply, the
contractor would trigger and investigation and in the future might not be eligible
for federal funds. 118
The government made clear that its aim was not to simply end worker discrimination, but to
increase minority employment. Many whites were enraged by these plans because they felt that
their jobs were being given away in these plans because a greater percentage of jobs were being
taken and given to minorities. Individuals tried to claim that these sorts of plans violated Title
VII on the basis that it gave minorities an un fair advantage and simply amounted to a quota.119
However the administration would not hear of it, claiming that the plans were simply hiring
goals and timetables made to correct the “underutilization” of minority workers, not quotas that
reserved spot for workers according to specific percentages.

Bakke

State universities received large amounts of funds from the federal government and thus
were also forced to begin hiring minority faculty. HEW was left to enforce compliance, and
immediately began attacking the “old boy tradition” which characterized many universities by
insisting that they take up affirmative action plans in order to hire both racial minorities and
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women faculty members. HEW made schools publicly advertise position openings and allow
spouses to teach at the same school. Although there were number of women who had PhDs,
African Americans only amounted to 1 percent of all PhDs in the whole nation. There was not a
large pool of minority professionals that schools could use to increase their minority faculty.
Universities would have to attract minorities in their undergraduate and graduate programs to
create a large pool of minority professionals and professors to fill their positions. In addition to
the duress applied by HEW, many medical and legal societies put pressure on all universities to
increase the number of minorities so that the programs were more representative of the regions
demographics.120 It was for these reasons that affirmative action programs for minorities were
first invoked in higher education.
To achieve a higher degree of racial diversity some universities adopted flexible
admissions plans that took account of many different features of an applicant such as race,
geographic origin, character traits, parent’s alumni status etc. However other universities
instituted policies that had strict numerical targets in terms of how many minority candidates
they would accept. These plans were essentially quotas. At the time the time there were disputes
over how rigid numerical need to be in order to constitute a quota. As illustrated before the
Nixon administration got away with calling what today would be considered quotas “hiring
goals.”
It was this type of plan that was at issue in the first Supreme Court case involving
affirmative action in higher education, Regent of the University v. Bakke decided in 1978. The
Bakke case formed the basis for the reasoning the Court would use to decide which affirmative
action plans a state funded university could adopt and which it could not. This case is essential to
understanding Parents Involved. Before its verdict affirmative action sought increase minority
120

Ibid.,151.

62
representation in public universities, but after the decision in Bakke this goal was fundamentally
altered. The reasoning that altered this goal was invoked specifically for higher education and
nothing else. However has now been applied in Parents Involved and could be potentially
destructive to much or what Brown and its progeny sought to accomplish.
The Medical School of University of California Davis had a special enrollment program
to make sure that it maintained substantial minority representation in its student body. Of the 100
total spots available in each freshmen class 16 spots were reserved for students from the special
enrollment program, which left only 84 spots for normal applicants. To be accepted into one of
the 84 spots individuals were evaluated by a committee of five members, each of whom could
give a total score of 100 points. These points were derived from a combination of an applicant’s
MCAT scores, letters of recommendation, extra curricular activities and other biographical data,
which were added together to form a benchmark score. The highest total score candidate could
get was 500 because each member on the committee could give a total of a 100.121
The 16 other spots were decided in a different manner. Individuals could only be
evaluated by this committee if they were, “economically or educationally disadvantaged”, and
were members of a minority group, which consisted of “Blacks, Chicanos, Asians or American
Indians.”122 Once in this program individuals were evaluated by the committee in a similar
fashion, and also given a benchmark score. However the evaluation process was far more
moderate than the normal program. For example, individuals did not have to meet 2.5 GPA
standard that applied to normal applicants but were still able to compete for the 84 normal spots
as well as the 16 spots reserved only for them.
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Allan Bakke, a blonde White male of Norwegian heritage, majored in mechanical
engineering at the University of Minnesota, graduated with a straight A average and went on to
get a masters degree at Stanford. In 1973 and 1974 Bakke repeatedly applied to 12 medical
schools and was not accepted into any of them.123 After being denied for the second time from
the University of California Davis and learning of their special program, which had allowed
applicants with far less merit than him to be accepted Bakke filed suit. He claimed that the
university had violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause as he
had not been able to compete for those other sixteen spots, because of his race, and consequently
those spots had gone to minorities with far less credentials. This he claimed amounted to racial
discrimination in a government funded program and was a violation of his personal rights. The
original California trial court ruled against the University, but did not grant Bakke admission
because he failed to prove that he would necessarily have gotten in absent the special program.
He appealed the case to the California Supreme Court, which ordered he be accepted. The
university in turn appealed and the case went the Supreme Court to be decided.
The Court failed to produce a unanimous decision or even a real majority opinion in its
verdict. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart and Burger formed a plurality that sided with Bakke
under the judgment that in fact Title VI did prohibit the school from excluding applicants from
equal consideration on the basis of their race. For judicial prudence sake these judges felt there
was no reason to even address whether there was a constitutional violation because they felt it
did violate Title VII. Another plurality consisting of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun felt that the university had committed no wrong and that the program was not a
violation or unconstitutional because those minority groups had been previously disadvantaged.
Justice Powell played the role of a swing judge. Placed in the middle of the dispute, Powell could
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chose either plurality and thus swing the majority in its favor. However instead of siding with
one side he chose to agree with only on certain points of both the pluralities in a separate opinion
that he formulated on his own. Although the reasoning behind each of the plurality’s positions is
interesting and very important, Justice Powell’s opinion was the verdict on the case and as will
be explained later has become the conventional of position of the Court in terms of how a
university can consider race in accepting applicants.
Powell did feel that the purpose of the 14th amendment was to create equality for
previously disadvantaged minorities. However he was disturbed by the reverse racism associated
with affirmative action in higher education. He was sympathetic to Bakke’s argument that he
was being deprived the equal protection of the law. Was it not indeed reverse racism to distribute
government benefits that are customarily based on merit to less qualified candidates because of
their predicaments? He felt that racial considerations were necessary, but felt that if they gave
minorities an uneven advantage in distributing benefits that were supposed to be assigned only
according to merit. Powell was in difficult position as he felt that both the Bakke and the
university had legitimate claims and for that reason could not decide between either of them.
This is the reason why Powell did not concur totally with either but constructed a separate
opinion that would conciliate both sides, not dismiss either as incorrect. I think Powell does a
good job of mediating the dispute, but feel that in this he was forced to adopt a controversial
reading of the 14th amendment and by doing so consequently sidesteps important facts.
The first part of Powell’s argument discussed the claims of Bakke. Bakke’s lawyer
claimed Davis’s plan was a violation of the protections he was guaranteed by Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, which forbids racial discrimination in institutions that are federally funded and
by the 14th Amendment. Powell denied that this claim violated Title IV explaining that it only
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“proscribed those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
amendment.”124 Thus for him the issue at hand was simply whether the plan employed by Davis
violated the 14th Amendment because Title VI could not exceed it in scope.
Powell needed to work out was what level of scrutiny to apply to the Davis’s program.
Bakke and his lawyer’s arguments were based in an individualist understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause. Bakke argued that although he was a white male, which as a group has never
been victimized in US history, he was still being deprived benefits on account of his race. Powell
agreed with Bakke on this individualist reading of the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so he
read the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as providing rights for individuals to assure
neutrality, not for protecting entire groups. It is this same method of reasoning that the Court
used to scrutinize the plans that is now at issue in Parents Involved that “ Racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination.”125
Powell’s take on the 14th Amendment acknowledges that the purpose of the amendment
was to “bridge the vast distance between members of the negro race and the white majority”,126
but at the same time rejects the University’s assertion that discriminating against the white
majority in a “benign” manner was not against the 14th Amendment. The previous chapter clearly
illustrated that the Supreme Court was willing to “impose burdens in some”127 particularly
Whites to bridge that vast distance and to assure equal opportunity in lower education for
minorities. Powell sidestepped this fact by arguing that the U.S. is was no longer a country in
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which one racial minority dominates society and is actually composed of many different
minorities:
The concepts of “majority” and “minority” necessarily reflect temporary
arrangements and political judgments…Not all of these groups can receive
preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance for distinctions drawn
on race and nationality, for then the only “majority” left would be a minority of
white Anglo Saxon protestants. There is no basis for deciding which groups
would “merit judicial solitude” and which would not.128
It might seem quite obvious which groups would need judicial solicitude. As described in Swann
or Keyes it would be the groups who have suffered discrimination by American society at large
and the laws and are consequently and much more frail when it comes to success in American
society. Those minority groups that have not been disadvantaged and are not debilitated do not.
Powell dealt with this issue in an odd way arguing that the university could compensate
for past injustices only in cases where there was a clear constitutional violation on the part of the
actor and that there was none in Bakke because the university was never by law segregated. This
the is same point that the Robert’s court makes, essentially that absent any constitutional
violation racial considerations should not be invoked. Powell stated that in the absence of a
constitutional violation “we have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the
absence of judicial, legislative or administrative, findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.”129 As I have already explained, the14th Amendment was made to account for
private actions occurring from society, which could exert significant for on its own. School
desegregation cases also advocated extensive use of race for remedies for constitutional
violations that were not even the result of specific statutory violations but rather school board
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policies combined with de facto segregation. Powell did not want to budge that compensatory
arguments were not valid absent a constitutional violation.
Justice Powell according to his reasoning would not budge on the fact that strict scrutiny
was the only option in evaluating programs such as the one employed by Davis The University
would have to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest associated with its plan which in turn
was narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny. The university asserted four target purposes.
The first one was to create higher amount of integration in the medical profession. The second
was to counter prior societal discrimination. The third was to increase the number of physicians
willing to work in underserved areas and the final purpose was to “obtain the educational
benefits that flow from and ethnically diverse student body.”130
The first interest Powell simply rejected flat out, stating that, “ preferring members of any
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for it own sake. This
the constitution forbids.”131 As one would expect, countering the effects of societal
discrimination was not legitimate because the University was not fully responsible for societal
discrimination. Also Powell rejected classifications, which imposed disadvantages upon persons
that were in no way responsible for the harm that the beneficiaries of the program had
suffered.132 He also disregarded the university’s third goal, the desire to increase the number of
individuals in the medical profession willing to work in communities that are underserved. This
was not satisfactory because as the university conceded, there was no way to actually know if the
minority doctors would actually work in underserved communities and conversely there were
more efficient ways to achieve this goal.
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The last objective was accepted by Powell as an interest compelling enough for a
university to consider an applicant’s race in its decision process. This interest was not for the
minority individuals applying, but rather the benefits that a diverse atmosphere of students would
produce. This diversity is not the same as having certain proportion of minorities, but rather a
diverse group of individuals Powell described this conception of diversity:
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of
the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups,
with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The
diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single
though important element.133
The only way that race could be used in compliance with such a standard is in a plan that does
not use race as a decisive factor in itself. He noted that the 1st amendment does protect a
university’s freedom to choose its own student body and that this would be a legitimate goal for
it to seek to achieve in choosing its applicants. 134
The plan in used by Davis clearly did not meet this criteria because the only way an
applicant could be accepted into the specific program was according to his race. According to
Powell’s position an individual’s personal rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment were being
violated by plans that reserved a “specific percentage of seats”:
The fatal flaw in the petitioners preferential treatment program is its disregard of
individual rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Such rights are not
absolute. But when a state’s distribution of benefits hinges on ancestry or the
color of a person’s skin that individual is entitled to demonstration that the
challenged classification is necessary.135
Powell’s position is essentially that if a university or any institution of higher education, which
are going to use race as a consideration must use it as one of many other considerations so that it
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is not decisive in itself. Powell went on to describe one admission plan used by Harvard law
school that would work because it had deemed race or ethnic background “a plus in a particular
applicants file…without race being a decisive factor…compared with…personal talents, unique
work or service, experience, leadership potential, maturity etc.…”136 This plan was flexible
enough to use race as a factor because it was not decisive in itself.
Powell mediated both sides of the argument by substituting the conventional argument
that historically disadvantaged minorities need special aid or compensation with one that was
distributive. Diversity would be better for the entire university not just the historically
disadvantaged minorities and could thus be taken into account. Diversity of this sort did not
specifically disadvantage candidates because they were white and allowed a university to still
consider a minority’s race in a manner that would enable them to be accepted not exclusively on
merit. In this way Powell was able to navigate the troubling paradox created in the 14th
Amendment that occurred when merit and compensation for historically disadvantaged were
came together.
This position became that of the Court after Bakke. Bakke did allow higher education to
use racial considerations, but in this limited sense, which was distributive and not specifically
compensatory. However Bakke was far from a unanimous decision unlike most of the school
desegregation cases discussed earlier. It was rather highly contentious and did not even wield a
majority till Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger argued in 2003.
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Grutter and Gratz

In 2003 the Supreme Court decided two cases in reference to the affirmative action
methods used by the University of Michigan. One concerning its law school Grutter v. Bollinger
and the other concerning its undergraduate program, College of Language, Science (LSA) and
Arts Gratz v. Bollinger. The decisions were divided into two separate cases, but were decided at
the same time in 2003 with differing verdicts. The Law School’s admission program was upheld
in Grutter v. Bollinger on the basis that the plan was narrowly tailored enough to achieve the
compelling interest of a “diverse student body” described by Powell in Bakke. However the plan
involved in Gratz v. Bollinger was repudiated because it was not narrowly tailored enough to
achieve the compelling interest of promoting a diverse student body. These decisions like Bakke
were not unanimous by any means and like Bakke do not carry the same weight as the
unanimous decision137 in Brown, Green and Swann do or even Keyes for that matter which was
7-1. However they do create a significant foundation for the types of plans and interests, which
are constitutionally acceptable in higher education and those that are not. This foundation is
based on the reasoning created by Powell in Bakke.
In Gratz v. Bollinger the University of Michigan employed an affirmative action
program, which sought to make sure that there was a representation of ethnic minority groups.
The admissions process awarded points based on an applicant’s grade point average,
standardized test scores, high school, curriculum, personal essay, in state residency etc. The
highest possible score and applicant could receive was 150 and all applicants with a score of 100
and above were admitted. Part of the scoring process in the plan was that any minority applicant
in an “under-represented” group would receive 20 points just for being part of that group. This
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meant that applicants who were such minorities only had to receive a score of 80 to be admitted,
because they had already received 20 points.
The majority in the case consisting of justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion,
O’Conner, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas and Stevens first stated that “all racial classifications
reviewable under the equal protection clause must be strictly scrutinized…the standard of
review…is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited.”138 This should come as no
surprise considering that Powell in Bakke had essentially declared the same thing. Rehnquist then
went on to analyze the plan employed by LSA. As one would expect the majority found that any
plan which awarded “ one fifth of the points need to guarantee admission” to any
underrepresented minority regardless of their back ground did take not race as one of many
factors but placed a large weight on it. This Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrated in a
hypothetical situation and concluded that the program was “not narrowly tailored to
achieve…asserted compelling interest in diversity”139 for this reason and therefore violated the
individual protection afforded by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment reaffirming
Justice Powell’s position in Bakke that race had to be one of many factors.
Grutter V. Bollinger is more instructive than Gratz v. Bollinger because it illustrated what
type of affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny. In this case
Barbra Grutter a white woman, disputed her rejection from the University of Michigan Law
School. She based on claim that the plan had violated her rights protected by the 14th
Amendment because the school had used “race as predominant factor, giving applicants who
belong to certain minority groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with
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similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.”140 However the Court ruled the plan
constitutional and deemed it flexible enough to pass strict scrutiny for the purpose of increasing
diversity in a student body. The criteria used by the University in many ways corresponds to the
one employed by Harvard that Powell described in Bakke141 that is designed to increase diversity
in the student body taking into account race as one of many considerations and not decisive on
its own. The plan was so flexible that the mechanics of it could not be divulged in the case.
The most interesting thing about the Court’s acceptance of the plan was that it praised it
because it was flexible “enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant, and place them on the same footing for consideration,
although not necessarily affording them the same weight. ”142 This was an extremely important
finding because even though race could not be decisive in itself the Supreme Court found that it
could be given significantly more weight than other factors. The law school could give a large
amount of weight to students of minorities that had been historically discriminated against
because there was an interest in a “critical mass of [underrepresented] minority students …to
ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the law school.”143 The
reasoning why the Court accepted the law schools interest in attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students was because it was necessary for “minority students to
participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.”144 The concept was that if there were not
enough minorities in the classroom, minority individuals would feel marginalized by racial
stereotypes and not feel comfortable expressing their views.145 With a critical mass the
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stereotypes would lose their force because nonminority students learn that there is no minority
viewpoint but rather a variety of viewpoints. The university did not specify that there was a
specific number or percentage for a critical mass rather only that it could not be accomplished
with only a token amount of minorities.146
This point is not the same as Brown. It is not that separation denotes feelings of
inferiority. However it does acknowledge that there is certain number of minorities needed to
receive the benefits of a diverse student body and that a token number is not acceptable because
those minority students will be too intimidated to express their view otherwise. It also
acknowledged that significantly more weight could be given to race of historically disadvantaged
minorities in the application process because otherwise they could not achieve a critical mass
necessary.147 The Court accepted that the law school could maintain a critical mass of Jewish or
Asian minorities without placing significant weight on their race because there were many with
adequate academic standings or test scores. However for other minorities such as Hispanics,
African Americans and Native Americans this was not the case and for this reason university
could, “place all pertinent elements…of each applicant on the same footing for consideration and
although not according to equal weight.148 This could not be done without some consideration of
race and the court also noted that, “narrowly tailoring does not require exhaustion of every race
neutral alternative.” Thus the admission program was allowed to remain in place and still give
certain races an advantage. This recognizes that individual rights guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment can be disregarded to a certain extent to increase minority representation in
institutions of higher education, which would otherwise not be possible even though it may not
be attributable to the university or the state but rather societal discrimination.
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The fact that universities could not employ quotas or make decisions based primarily on
race, because of individual’s rights which the court afforded protection by the 14th Amendment
is significant. This is the Anti-Classification principle the court applied to public education in
Parents Involved, which is that absent any state intended action which requires a remedy a
school district can only take race into account for this type of diversity not for preventing racial
isolation and maintaining unitary schools. Also such a plan must be narrowly tailored so that all
aspects of diversity and of a student [not an applicant] are taken to account, not just race itself.
This reasoning was created to conciliate the paradox created in the 14th Amendment when
benefit that would normally be awarded based on merit are mixed with racial considerations.
This reasoning has now been brought down to public education which is a benefit not distributed
by merit but to everyone because no one could expect to succeed in society without it.
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Conclusion

I began with the case Parents Involved in Community School District NO. 1. and am now
returning to it after exploring the history of which it is a result. In the next chapter I elucidated
the creation of the 14th Amendment. The purpose of the amendment as intended by its framers
was to enable the federal government to ardently protect the rights that it had just endowed to
African Americans from both state and private interference. Some have claimed that this power
was meant to create equality for African Americans, but it is clear that in the eyes of the framers
the protection only for the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. All other rights not
enumerated in the act were to be left to the States. Although the meaning of the 14th Amendment
today has been greatly debated and is in many respects controversial, it remains clear that the
intent of its framers at a minimum was to protect those rights of African Americans which they
felt were necessary to have a free existence in the United States of America.
Most of the Supreme Court’s history concerning the use of race in public education has
dealt with the issue of states segregating their public schools and depriving minorities of equal
opportunities. The cases that it has decided have only been discussed in the context of the
amount and types of compensation states could be forced to distribute to minorities debilitated by
their harmful policies. Parents Involved in Community School District NO. 1. marks a turning
point in this history. Its concern is not with what a state must be forced to do, but what a state
may voluntarily do. This case had the difficulty of reconciling two difficult readings of the 14th
Amendment both originating in education. One which rejects all racial classifications no matter
their nature in order to secure neutrality of all individuals despite the fact of race, color, sex,
religion etc. This reading focuses on individual rights. The other is one that is the original intent
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of the 14th Amendment, which was “to secure the rights necessary for Blacks and other
minorities so that they could bridge the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the
white majority.”149 This reading focuses on the rights of disadvantaged groups. The plurality
represented by Justice Roberts chose to accept the former, that absent any prior violation a state
cannot invoke racial classifications to combat societal discrimination. According to Robert’s
opinion states do not have a compelling interest in preventing racially identifiable schools, which
are not of their making.
In the third chapter I attempted to trace the history of the 14th Amendment protecting the
rights of minorities in public education. The major starting point in this history was Brown v.
Board of Education. This case contrary to public opinion did not hold segregation itself to be
unconstitutional. What it did do essentially was make public education an enumerated right
protected by the 14th Amendment. Chief Earl Warren in his famous opinion proclaimed:
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the
laws… In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 150
Warren in this proclamation made clear that during the time the 14th Amendment was created,
public education was one of those rights, left to the states under the 14th Amendment. However
his opinion is straightforward that in the present history of the United States public education has
such a large role that it would have to be considered an enumerated right . It therefore was a right
“which must be made available to all on equal terms.”151
The reason why legally segregated schools were declared unconstitutional in Brown was
not because segregation was unconstitutional, but because public education had achieved such a
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high degree of importance that it had become an enumerated right. The other part of the Brown
decision was that it overturned the “separately but equal” doctrine in public school because it
was not actually equal. Segregated schooling was unconstitutional because it negatively affected
African American academic motivation, which consequently deprived them that right to public
education.
The Brown decision although revolutionary was naïve in many respects. It was seemingly
unconscious of the implications of the fact that it was elevating public education to such a high
level and then declaring the segregated school system unconstitutional because of its effects. By
declaring segregation unconstitutional because of the ills associated with it, naturally suggested
integration as logical means to eliminate those ills. When the Civil War was over Congress knew
that the South would be extremely recalcitrant in respecting the rights of African Americans.
This is why it created the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court did not have such prudence and
was relatively unclear and unassertive in its prescriptions. The Court would learn in the years
directly following Brown that simply guaranteeing neutrality in public school assignments even
in places such as Kent County would not produce the change it had envisioned. It was clear that
society apart from the states could wield enough force to maintain segregated schools. Brown did
not acknowledge that to eliminate the dual quality that characterized the American school
system, it would have to force integration.
In the fourth chapter I attempted to recount the Court’s path to realizing what it would
take to get the states to desegregate after Brown. First the court made clear in Green that
eliminating the dual school system was its goal, not just creating a race neutral environment. Its
objective was to actually force Blacks and Whites to associate with each other in school, not just
to remove the walls that had separated them. The next decision was Swann where the Court
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approved of a district court forcing a school board to adopt a plans that much more drastic than
the school district thought appropriate. In this decision the it unanimously acknowledged that it
was acceptable and even in some cases necessary to force a school board to adopt remedial plans
that assigned pupils to schools on an explicit racial basis, all for the purpose of desegregation. In
requiring such a plan the Court acknowledged that there were other government actions besides
explicitly racial statutes, which could create segregation. To adequately remedy the effects of
these techniques it was necessary that districts be forced to adopt complex plans specified to
actually resolve their predicaments. The next step was Keyes, which was not unanimous but still
a 7-1 majority. This required school boards to adopt plans even absent an explicit segregative
statute. All that was needed was simply covert school board policies combined with de facto
discrimination that to create racially identifiable schools. This case also acknowledged that there
were other minorities besides African American that could be victims of racially identifiable
schools.
In recounting these cases it becomes apparent that the Supreme Court after Brown made
clear that its goal was to force districts to eliminate all racially identifiable schools even if those
districts were only minimally responsible presence of those schools. This dedication suggests
that the court decision in Brown was not to create neutrality but rather equal opportunity in
public education. This goal was of the utmost importance to the extent that the rights of state
sovereignty were almost entirely negligible if those states did not actively try to pursue
integration. Entire districts were forced their children to take long bus rides to get school and
made their parents pay for it with their taxes.
It is true that the court made clear that districts would not have to eliminate racially
identifiable schools if those schools were not in any way attributable to a district’s policies.
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However the emphasis the court gave to eliminating racially imbalanced school should not be
overlooked. The plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan in the Bakke decision did interpret
this history as allowing states to voluntarily prevent racially identifiable schools:
…school boards, even in the absence of a judicial finding of past discrimination,
could voluntarily adopt plans which assigned students with the end of creating
racial pluralism by establishing fixed ratios of black and white students in each
school.152
Justice Brennan felt that it was not even a matter of dispute that racially balancing schools was a
permissible state activity. None of the opinions in the Bakke decision reject this statement in at
all or even address it. The question of whether a state could protect its minorities from society’s
private forces in the realm of public schools appeared to be determined by the time of the Bakke
of the decision.
However in Parents Involved Robert’s plurality rejected preventing racially identifiable
schools as a compelling interest for a state to voluntarily pursue. Robert’s rejection was based on
the precedent created by Powell’s opinion in Bakke as well as its progeny opinions, Gratz v.
Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger. What this plurality failed to realize I think was that the
reasoning invoked in this precedent is far more defensible in the context of higher education.
Justice Powell in his opinion recognized that racial considerations affecting the distribution of
government benefits that would customarily be distributed on the basis of merit were much
harder to justify than those that did not. Unlike public school assignments, which were after
Brown were essentially considered an enumerated right, acceptance into an institution of higher
education was a privilege based on what one had accomplished. To be denied this privilege on
the basis of race and not solely because of lesser merit was a much more serious deprival than
not being able to attend the school closest to one’s home. The former was not able to get a degree
152
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while the latter is not able to attend school within walking distance from home. Powell
recognized the difference between the two and for this reason formulated a new justification for
using racial considerations in higher education.
Powell’s reasoning is rooted in the idea that diversity is an acceptable goal for an
institution of higher education to pursue in its student body. This diversity is not simply based on
race, but on numerous factors. By using diversity Justice Powell justifies racial considerations by
a distributive rationale, not one that is compensative. Diversity in a student body would be better
for the learning environment and thus everyone in the institution, not just minorities. This is why
it has become a compelling interest that is pursuable higher education. If Powell had intended for
this reasoning to be applied in lower education it would seem logical that he would have said so
explicitly in Bakke, especially in response to Brennan’s assertion that this was implicit in Swann.
The Grutter v. Bollinger added to Powell’s reasoning in such a way that suggests that
even for the distributive goal of diversity, race can be given greater weight than other factors.
The Court recognized for minority applicants to participate effectively in class there needed to be
a “critical mass” of them in order to break stereotypes. To achieve this critical mass certain races
would have to be given more weight in the application process. Certain minority groups that
have been historically discriminated against would not have been able to attain a critical mass in
the university otherwise. Thus even in higher education there is evidence that the court does
acknowledge that historically disadvantaged minorities need to be afforded more weight
according to their race than others because they lag behind in academic performance.
By taking this reasoning used by Powell and the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger and
applying it to a case concerned with public schools Justice Roberts makes a large philosophical
shift. He diverges from the compensative rational that has been unanimously applied to public
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schools in desegregation for one that is not by any means unanimous even for affirmative action.
Powell’s is the product of a man who tried to grapple with the perplexing paradox created by the
14th Amendment that occurs when merit comes into play. This reasoning is not applicable in the
absence of merit because public education is a practically enumerated right that states have been
forced to respect and should be able to voluntarily protect from all forms of interference. It
makes little sense that school districts, which have been forced over the years to compensate for
racial inequalities and pursue integration in their schools, are now not allowed to take these same
steps voluntarily for that same purpose.
Since Brown v. Board of Education America has been on a long journey to realize equal
opportunity for all races in public education. The first step was to remove the walls that
separated races. Simply removing these walls was not enough to create unitary schools where
different races would go to school together. Society by itself wielded enough strength to keep
races apart even once the laws dividing them were removed. Integration if it were to happen
would had to be forced. This process is not over. One would be crazy to believe that inequalities
such as residential segregation and racially isolated schools do not still plague many of the
minorities that reside in the U.S. Although we have made great progress there is still a long way
to go. The decision in Parents Involved has the potential to stop this progress.
The United States of America is made up of numerous races, ethnic groups, religions etc.
It is the epitome of a pluralistic society. For this society to be fair and function to the best of its
abilities its citizens must grow up understanding that they are part many cultures not just their
own. Racially isolating children in one of their chief learning environments is detrimental to this
purpose. Children of different races need to grow up with one another so that they understand
that America as a society is based on the ideal of racial neutrality.
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